In this paper presentation, Professor David Dyzenhaus (University of Toronto) will argue that Kelsen’s account of the nature of international law and of the logical and normative necessity of monism is not refuted by Hart, and that Hart distorted Kelsen in order to refute him. Dyzenhaus claims that, properly understood, Kelsen’s account of international law can illuminate how the philosophy of law might productively address some its central problems.
David Dyzenhaus is a professor of Law and Philosophy at the University of Toronto, and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. He holds the Albert Abel Chair of Law and was appointed in 2015 to the rank of University Professor. Professor Dyzenhaus is the author of Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems: South African Law in the Perspective of Legal Philosophy (now in its second edition), Legality and Legitimacy: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen, and Hermann Heller in Weimar, and Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation and the Apartheid Legal Order. He has edited and co-edited several collections of essays. In 2004 he gave the JC Smuts Memorial Lectures to the Faculty of Law, Cambridge University. These were published by Cambridge University Press in 2006 as The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency. He is editor of the University of Toronto Law Journal and co-editor of the series Cambridge Studies in Constitutional Law.
The paper will be sent to registered participants. A pre-read of the paper is highly desirable. To register and receive the paper, follow this link.